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Governments Love OSINT. Until Citizens Use It
Governments Love OSINT. Until Citizens Use It
| July 6, 2026

A small motorboat passes anchored vessels in the Strait of Hormuz off Bandar Abbas, Iran, on June 11, 2026. Photo: AP

Governments have spent decades investing billions in intelligence. Then the internet happened.

Today, commercial satellites, aircraft transponders, smartphones, social media and artificial intelligence have fundamentally changed how information is collected, verified and analysed.

Intelligence is no longer gathered exclusively behind classified walls. Increasingly, it is gathered in public.

This is the age of open-source intelligence, or OSINT.

Satellite imagery, ship-tracking platforms, ADS-B flight data, commercial imagery, geolocation and metadata have democratized intelligence. Governments use these tools. Journalists use them. Human rights organisations use them. Citizens use them.

The intelligence revolution has already happened.

The war in Ukraine accelerated that transformation. Western intelligence agencies now routinely combine classified reporting with commercially available satellite imagery.

Military planners increasingly purchase imagery from companies such as Maxar, Planet Labs and BlackSky rather than relying exclusively on state-owned assets. Commercial innovation has fundamentally reshaped the intelligence cycle.

Michael Shrader, Vice President for Intelligence and Innovative Solutions at Carahsoft, argues that the explosion of publicly available data is forcing intelligence agencies to rethink how they collect, analyse and act on information.

Governments are adapting because they have little choice.

The same tools that expose battlefield movements can strengthen disaster response, improve border monitoring, support election observation, detect illegal fishing, track maritime traffic and help counter terrorism.

Open-source intelligence is no longer a hobby for aviation enthusiasts like Johnny Gemini or online investigators. It is becoming one of the pillars of modern intelligence.

Its rise also marks an inflection point.

For generations, governments enjoyed a near monopoly over intelligence collection. Today, ordinary citizens equipped with laptops, satellite imagery and publicly available databases can reconstruct events that once required sophisticated state capabilities.

That shift has made many governments uncomfortable.

Kenya itself is no stranger to digital intelligence. Human rights organisations have alleged that authorities relied on social media and other digital information to identify organisers during anti-government protests.

Whether those allegations ultimately withstand legal scrutiny is a matter for the courts. They nevertheless illustrate a broader reality: governments increasingly understand the value of publicly available digital information.

Yet that understanding appears to disappear when citizens deploy the same methods.

The arrests of two Kenyans accused of tracking President William Ruto’s official travel through publicly available flight-tracking data illustrate that contradiction.

Flight tracking is not espionage.

Researchers and journalists routinely use platforms such as ADS-B Exchange, FlightRadar24 and FlightAware to verify aircraft movements, investigate illicit supply chains and confirm breaking news.

These services process ADS-B transponder signals transmitted by aircraft to produce publicly accessible flight data.

This is standard journalistic practice.

When Kabul fell to the Taliban in 2021, journalists tracked evacuation flights into and out of Afghanistan using publicly available flight data.

One aircraft that attracted attention was a Kenyan-registered Boeing 727-200 operated by Nairobi-based Safe Air, whose movements were independently verified through open-source tracking platforms.

When former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad fled Damascus in December 2024, reports suggested his aircraft disappeared from public tracking after its transponder was switched off.

The lesson was simple: if governments or aircraft operators genuinely wish to conceal movements, established technical mechanisms already exist.

Many governments, corporations and private individuals already request that their aircraft be blocked from public flight-tracking services for security or privacy reasons.

President William Ruto is therefore neither the first nor will he be the last public official whose travel is inferred through publicly available ADS-B data.

Open-source intelligence has also transformed investigative journalism.

In 2024, the Netherlands-based investigative collective Bellingcat worked alongside Kenya’s Daily Nation to identify Kenyan-labelled ammunition crates inside an alleged Rapid Support Forces depot near Khartoum.

Using satellite imagery, geolocation techniques and open-source verification, investigators established that the crates were in the vicinity of the Sudanese capital. Nearby ammunition tins matched the labels found on the crates.

The investigation did not rely on classified intelligence.

It relied on OSINT. That is precisely why the current debate matters.

The Kenyan government is blurring two fundamentally different issues.

Publishing classified operational plans is one thing. Assisting hostile actors is another. Compromising active security operations is a serious criminal offence.

Analysing publicly available aviation data is something entirely different.

If authorities genuinely believe individuals coordinated with terrorist organisations or hostile actors, they should present that evidence before an independent court. Public allegations cannot substitute for proof.

Governments cannot simultaneously celebrate the intelligence revolution while prosecuting citizens for participating in it.

If Kenya wishes to become a digital economy, an innovation hub and a regional technology leader, it cannot treat open-source intelligence as espionage simply because the information is politically inconvenient.

Today the controversy concerns a private presidential aircraft.

Tomorrow it could concern satellite imagery documenting illegal logging, ship-tracking exposing sanctions evasion, or geolocation evidence uncovering human rights abuses.

The issue has never been one aircraft.

It is whether publicly available information can remain public without fear of criminal sanction.

The intelligence revolution has already happened.

Governments can adapt to it. They can regulate its misuse. They can improve operational security where necessary.

What they cannot do is put the genie back in the bottle. 


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