
Kenya, South Africa and the Contest for Africa’s Voice
By Judy Mbugua
| June 2, 2026

South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and Kenyan President William Ruto address the media following bilateral talks at State House in Nairobi on November 9, 2022. Photo: Handout
When President William Ruto arrives in Pretoria for a three-day state visit this week, he will seek to reaffirm relations with one of Africa’s most influential powers.
Yet beneath the diplomatic ceremony lies a relationship increasingly shaped by diverging foreign policies and competing visions of Africa’s place in the world.
Both countries are regional economic hubs and vocal advocates for African agency. But as geopolitical competition intensifies, they are increasingly pursuing different pathways to global influence.
Kenya has deepened engagement with Western powers as a pragmatic intermediary between Africa and the West while South Africa embraces an assertive Global South posture, aligning with emerging powers that challenge Western hegemony.
Despite these differences, they remain aligned on multilateral issues. Kenya’s UN diplomat, Ekitela Lokaale, told this outlet both countries have consistently advocated for reforming global governance, greater African representation within the UN system, and stronger AU-UN cooperation.
He also noted that their diplomats work together on sustainable development, peacebuilding, and digital governance.
Yet shared objectives do not always mean shared strategies.
When South Africa hosted the historic G20 Summit in Johannesburg in late 2025, Kenya’s diplomatic posture came under intense scrutiny.
Despite its loud calls for increased African agency, Nairobi’s top leadership stayed clear, opting to send a low level delegation that mirrored Washington’s boycott of the summit.
Analysts suggest Kenya’s move signalled discomfort with Pretoria’s anti-Western agenda. South Africa’s focus on climate resilience and wealth redistribution clashed with US priorities, prompting the boycott and Pretoria’s subsequent exclusion from the 2026 US-led G20 process.
Kenya’s decision not to attend the Johannesburg summit was widely read as a signal of alignment with Washington, with officials privately supporting the African Union attendance of the 2026 G20 in Miami, framing the tensions as a bilateral issue between the U.S. and South Africa rather than a continental grievance.
It was therefore notable when President Cyril Ramaphosa skipped the France–Africa Summit in Nairobi last month. The timing drew attention, coming shortly after reports that France had withdrawn his invitation to the upcoming G7 Summit in France and extended it to Ruto instead.
While his office cited scheduling constraints, the sequence fuelled speculation about widening divergence between Africa’s two leading powers in how they engage Western partners and respond to global security and geopolitical challenges.
The Russia–Ukraine war highlights these dynamics clearly. When the crisis began, Kenya adopted one of Africa’s strongest pro-Ukraine positions, condemning Russia at the UN Security Council and calling for respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
South Africa, by contrast, declined to condemn Moscow despite sustained Western pressure, abstaining from key UN resolutions and attributing the conflict to NATO expansion.
UN General Assembly voting data, however, shows both overlap and divergence. According to U.S. State Department figures, Kenya aligned with U.S.-prioritised positions 42% of the time in 2024, compared to South Africa’s 39%.
On Russia–Ukraine-related resolutions, Kenya’s alignment with the U.S. stood at 75%, versus South Africa’s 50%, with similar trends in 2023.
This points to Kenya’s closer alignment with Western positions on Ukraine, while South Africa maintains greater strategic flexibility shaped by BRICS membership, historic ties with Russia, and a non-aligned approach to great-power competition.
The divergence extended to the recruitment of African nationals into Russian forces. After a Kenyan intelligence report found over 1,000 Kenyans had been deceived into joining the war, Nairobi reached an agreement with Moscow in March 2026 to halt recruitment.
South Africa has quietly repatriated affected citizens but avoided public confrontation with Russia.
Although Kenya has subtly adjusted its position on the Russia–Ukraine conflict, moving from earlier vocal criticism toward a more neutral and non-aligned stance outlined in a new foreign policy sessional paper, it has remained cautious toward Russia’s actions.
Unlike Ukraine, where voting patterns reveal a clear divergence between Nairobi and Pretoria, the Israel-Palestine conflict presents a more nuanced picture.
UN General Assembly voting records show that both countries frequently opposed U.S. positions on resolutions relating to the conflict.
In 2024, Kenya’s voting coincidence with Washington stood at 13%, compared with 10% for South Africa. The narrow gap suggests convergence in multilateral voting despite differences in rhetoric and bilateral relations with Israel.

Yet similar voting behaviour conceals important differences in diplomatic posture. While Kenya has maintained political, economic and security relations with Israel and generally adopted a pragmatic approach, South Africa has pursued a more activist strategy, including bringing a case against Israel before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and employing considerably sharper rhetoric.
The differences in strategy and rhetoric became physically visible when a chartered flight carrying 153 Palestinians from Gaza transited through Kenya to South Africa, an arrangement that drew intense public scrutiny and criticism in Pretoria.
While Kenya’s role remained limited to transit facilitation, the incident highlighted its transactional approach to Middle Eastern dynamics against South Africa’s highly ideologised legal framing.
The two countries also disagree over Israel’s engagement with Africa. While South Africa led efforts to isolate and block Israel’s bid for African Union observer status, helping secure the shelving of the application, Kenya said it did not oppose the move.

Nairobi and Pretoria have also repeatedly found themselves competing for influence within the African Union, including through rival bids and opposing positions in elections for senior continental posts.
This competition has also surfaced in regional security arrangements, most recently in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. Kenya initially led the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF) in an attempt to stabilise the mineral-rich region, but strained relations with Kinshasa led to its withdrawal.
In the vacuum, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) deployed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (SAMIDRC), with South Africa as the principal troop contributor and a more offensive military posture.
While both states framed their engagement through multilateral commitments to regional stability, the transition between these missions highlighted an underlying contest for strategic influence on continental security and governance outcomes.
Taken individually, none of these episodes amounts to a diplomatic rupture, but together they reveal a more structured divergence in external orientation. The Ruto state visit to Pretoria therefore offers a timely opportunity to assess how both sides intend to manage these differences going forward.
The challenge is not convergence of policy positions but the development of a more disciplined framework for managing divergence while preserving active coordination on shared continental priorities.
In an increasingly fragmented international environment, Africa’s collective influence will depend less on rhetorical alignment and more on pragmatic diplomatic management of strategic differences.
Mwangi Maina contributed to this report.
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